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Multilateral bargaining, Hold-up, 
Irreversible investment, Collusion
In late 2005, the German energy companies E.ON and Wintershall and Russian 
Gazprom reached an agreement to build a new huge pipeline Nord Stream through 
the Baltic Sea. This pipeline will provide Russia for the first time ever with the direct 
access to its Western European customers. This pipeline will contribute to the security 
of the Western Europe’s energy supply through creating an alternative supply oppor-
tunity for the case when conflicts with the current transit states lead to disruptions 
in supply. The realization of the project will also shift the bargaining power from the 
transit states to the benefit of both Russia and the Western European natural gas 
importers. Particularly, White Russia as well as the Ukraine will have to accept lower 
transit fees in the future and have fewer means left to enforce special conditions for 
their own natural gas imports. The decision to construct the pipeline can be viewed 
as a consequence of institutional and political weaknesses in the transit states.
Natural gas accounts for about a quarter of the primary energy consumption in 
the European Union. It can be expected that its importance in the energy supply 
will continue to grow because, among others, natural gas is considered to be an 
environment friendly source of energy. Since internal production in the European 
Union is sinking and Norway is not likely to substantially increase production, 
imports from other regions will increase.1 There are just a few alternatives to the 
natural gas supplies from Russia. While the deliveries of liquefied gas from Africa, 
especially from Nigeria, as well as the Middle East will increase, it will certainly be 
necessary to construct and expand the plants required to regasify the liquefied gas. 
Additional gas pipelines from areas other than Russia are being discussed, such as 
from Algeria and the Caspian Sea region and Iran (the Nabucco pipeline).2
Over the last few years about a quarter of the EU‘s natural gas consumption has been 
covered by imports from Russia. For some countries this figure is clearly higher. 
In this way Germany covered 43 percent of its 2007 demand with natural gas from 
1 The EU Commission assumes in one scenario that the imports of natural gas to the EU will almost double between 
2005 and 2030, with more than half of this increase required to compensate for declines in the EU‘s own production. 
See Directorate General for Energy and Transport: European Energy and Transport. Trends to 2030—Update 2007. 
Brussels 2008.
2 In both of these cases the underlying political conditions are by no means favourable. Furthermore, these regions 
are primarily suitable for supplying southern and south-east Europe. For information on the long-term perspectives of 
natural gas supply to Europe, see also Engerer, H., Horn, M.: Europäische Erdgasversorgung erfordert Diversifizierung 
und Ausbau der Infrastruktur./The European Natural Gas Supply Requires Diversification and the Expansion of the 
Infrastructure. Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin No. 42/2006.Baltic Sea Pipeline
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Russian fields; in Italy the share amounted to 31 
percent and in Austria to 63 percent.3 The construc-
tion of additional pipelines from Russia is often 
associated with a growing dependence on the part 
of Europe. Already during the Soviet Union time, 
the USA issued warnings about Western Europe‘s 
dependence on imports and exerted massive political 
pressure, which did ultimately prove in vain, to pre-
vent the construction of the first pipelines through 
the Ukraine and Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 
’80s. Even today about four-fifths of the Russian 
exports to Europe are flowing through the pipeline 
system built at that time. After the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union, at first Russia was completely 
dependent on the transit route through the Ukraine 
for its gas exports. It was only with the completion 
of a pipeline through White Russia and Poland in 
1998 that a second export corridor was created in 
the north-west region of Europe. It has a capacity of 
28 billion cubic metres of gas per year and is named 
„Yamal“ after a gas field in western Siberia which 
however still does not supply any gas to it (map).4 
A second leg of the pipeline for which the sections 
at the major river courses have already been laid 
should have doubled the capacity of the pipeline 
in one go. However the plans for Yamal II soon 
ground to a halt and apparently they were finally 
abandoned when in late 2005 the German energy 
companies E.ON and Wintershall together with Rus-
sian Gazprom decided to construct the Nord Stream 
pipeline through the Baltic Sea.5 When construction 
is complete, the Baltic Sea pipeline should consist 
of two pipelines with a planned transport capacity 
of 60 billion cubic metres per year and will provide 
direct connection from Vyborg in Russia to Lubmin 
near Greifswald in Germany.
Nord Stream Baltic Sea Gas Pipeline: 
A Controversial Project
The decision in favour of Nord Stream has triggered 
off fierce discussions.6 The critics have produced an 
3 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2008.
4 This study is mainly concentrated on the north-west European region 
to which the gas is delivered through the Ukraine with the transit points 
in Germany and Austria. About 70 billion cubic metres of gas per year 
can be delivered through these transit points. It is only for this supply 
that Yamal and Nord Stream represent alternative supply routes. The 
pipelines in the Ukraine also deliver natural gas to east and south-east 
Europe. These are not marked on the map. In total approximately 120 
billion cubic metres of gas flow through the Ukraine each year as transit 
supplies. The maximum export capacity is estimated to be around 140 
billion cubic metres of gas per year. For south-east Europe, the „Blue 
Stream“ and „South Stream“ pipeline projects in the Black Sea have a 
similar strategic importance to that of Nord Stream for the north-west 
Europe.
5 Subsequently the Dutch-based Gasunie supplier took a stake in the 
project, so that the company’s shares are distributed as follows: 51 per-
cent is held by Gazprom, 20 percent each by E.ON and Wintershall/BASF 
and 9 percent by Gasunie.
6 On the Russian side, the connection of the new pipeline to the gas sy-
stem is already under construction. In Germany and the other neighbou-
array of arguments against the project: On the one 
hand renewed warnings have been made about the 
growing dependence on Russian gas imports. With 
Nord Stream, Russia would be able to increase its 
export capacity to north-west Europe by about 60 
percent. In the event that these volumes are indeed 
additionally supplied, Russia would be able to fur-
ther strengthen its position of the dominant supplier. 
At the same time there is some doubt whether the 
transport capacities will be used on this scale in the 
foreseeable future. Russia is behind schedule in de-
veloping new gas fields which could fill the pipeline 
with the necessary gas. And it still has to be clarified 
where the gas should come from for such a massive 
increase in exports.7 Likewise there are still no firm 
buyers for such volumes. It is conceivable that part 
of the gas flowing through northern Germany will 
be transported further to England. However these 
plans seem to be too vague as a way to justify the 
ring states, the required permit procedures and environmental impact 
assessments are ongoing.
7 At the current pace of development, gas from the new fields on the 
Yamal peninsula will first be available when production from the old 
fields tapers off. The gas from the Barents Sea (Stockman Field), once 
it is actually available, will probably be liquefied and not fed into the 
pipeline system as originally planned. Despite having major reserves, the 
opportunities to increase the exports of Russian gas are limited due the 
high development costs. See also Stern, J.: The Future of Russian Gas and 
Gazprom. Oxford 2005; Engerer, H., Horn M., a.a.O.; Engerer, H., Kemfert, 
C.: Russland: Energieeffizienz und Klimaschutz kommen zu kurz./Russia: 
Energy Efficiency and Climate Protection Miss Out. Wochenbericht des 






















   In operation
   Under construction
   Projected
   Under discussion
   
   
Gas pipelines
Source: Hubert, F., Ikonnikova, S.: Investment Options and Bargaining Power  
in the Eurasian Supply Chain for Natural Gas. Discussion Paper 2007.    DIW Berlin 2009Baltic Sea Pipeline
83 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 12/2009
significant investment costs. Finally the argument 
has been raised that Nord Stream is by far and away 
the most expensive of all the options to expand the 
transport capacities for Russian gas. It would be a 
great deal cheaper to renovate the Ukraine transit 
system or lay the second leg of the pipeline along 
the Yamal route through White Russia and Poland. 
Even new pipelines through the Baltic states and 
Poland recently suggested under the name „Amber“ 
would amount to less than half of the Nord Stream 
costs.8 
The security of the energy supply has played an 
important role in the discussions. It is also a central 
aim of Europe‘s energy policy. However like with 
many other policy objectives, on closer examina-
tion the concept proves to be fuzzy. Depending on 
the intention, it is understood to be the geological 
and technical availability of energy sources and 
transport routes, the contractual guarantee of access, 
the provision of either stable or the lowest possible 
purchase prices, the diversification of the supply 
sources or independence from imports. Correspond-
ingly, the energy security argument is advanced both 
for and against the Baltic Sea pipeline.
Pipeline Creating Mutual 
Dependencies
First, it has to be noted that Western Europe‘s de-
pendence on Russian imports will grow only in case 
that Nord Stream supplies additional natural gas 
from Russia and not just redirects gas from other 
transit routes. However such a pipeline would cre-
ate, in fact, mutual dependence. In the same way that 
an importer makes himself dependent on a certain 
region for gas supply, the producer also commits 
himself to permanently supply his natural gas to a 
specific region at the other end of the pipeline. And 
with natural gas this reciprocity is true to a unique 
extent, because natural gas cannot be transported 
as a liquefied gas to a destination different from 
the one of the given pipeline. In other words, the 
growth in Russia‘s exports to Western Europe will 
lead to the increase of its dependence on it. This 
mutual dependence motivates the common neces-
sity for long-term balance of interests. In the past 
this balance was found through supply contracts 
with terms of more than 30 years. The proponents 
of the pipeline argue that Nord Stream offers the 
opportunity to secure long-term contractual access 
to gas fields in western Siberia that still have to be 
developed. In this sense, the project contributes to 
the security of the energy supply.
8 For the differing costs of the various pipeline options see Hubert, F., 
Ikonnikova, S.: Investment Options and Bargaining Power in the Eurasian 
Supply Chain for Natural Gas. Discussion Paper 2007.
However two questions still remain open: Why is 
it that Nord Stream, the most expensive of all the 
pipeline options, has been chosen? And why is it 
that the capacity is targeted that seems to be exces-
sive in view of the demand and the supply options? 
Apparently the reasons can be found in the transit 
problematic. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
no stable arrangements between Russia, Ukraine 
and White Russia were found for gas exports and 
transit fees.9
Repeated Conflicts Along the Transit 
Routes
Russia‘s energy relations with the Ukraine have been 
marked from the very beginning with disputes about 
unpaid bills and unauthorised extractions from the 
gas system by the Ukraine. In a series of high lev  el 
political negotiations, the partners have trudged from 
one short-term solution to the next. After a principle 
agreement achieved in 2002/2003 was   aborted again 
in its implementation, the conflict escalated between 
December 2005 and January 2006. At that point in 
time the Ukraine was paying only about a third of 
the usual international prices for its gas imports. 
Russia then insisted that significantly higher prices 
were to be built into new supply contracts, which 
the Ukraine rejected. When they had still failed to 
reach agreement on 31st December 2005 for the 2006 
deliveries, with no supply contracts at place Russia 
reduced the volume of gas being fed into the system 
on 1st January 2006 by the quantity destined for the 
Ukraine. However as the Ukraine did not reduce 
its own consumption, corresponding disruptions in 
supply occurred further to the west. Right after that 
Russia buckled under the massive pressure exerted 
by the Western Europe importers and increased its 
gas deliveries again. In the end it did not want to 
endanger its reputation of a reliable supplier gained 
during the previous decades.
The hope that Western Europe could remain unda-
maged from the conflict about the gas transportation 
was shattered in January 2009. After the negotiations 
in the autumn and winter of 2008 collapsed several 
times just before agreement was to be reached, the 
parties became so entrenched that Russia stopped 
the supplies completely in order to prevent the Ukra-
ine from using the gas supplies destined for Western 
Europe to make up for its own reduction in supply. 
Nevertheless, since the Ukraine also had access to 
the storage facilities along the pipeline system, the 
cessation of deliveries affected primarily the south-
9 For further details see Stern, J.: The Russian Ukrainian Gas Crisis of 
January 2006. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2006; Yafimava, K., 
Stern, J.: The 2007 Russia-White Russia Gas Agreement. Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies, 2007; Hubert, F., Ikonnikova S., in the passage cited.Baltic Sea Pipeline
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east European countries which have no alternative 
supply routes available to them. It was only after 
two weeks of tough negotiations that a compromise 
could be found that delivered a solution to the acute 
supply crisis.
The impact of the conflict on the northern countries 
was less pronounced because, among others, they 
receive a share of their gas imports from the Yamal 
pipeline through White Russia and Poland. How-
ever this route is also by no means secure. After the 
completion of the Yamal pipeline, relations between 
Russia and White Russia chilled considerably. Like 
the Ukraine, White Russia has also resisted any ad-
justment of its import prices up to the international 
level. When White Russia diverted gas from transit 
pipelines in February 2004, Russia reacted again 
by completely stopping the supplies. In this way 
any access White Russia had to Russian gas was 
effectively blocked, but also the recipients located 
further to the west—and especially Poland, Germa-
ny and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad—were 
cut off accordingly. However at that time it proved 
possible to resolve the conflict so quickly that no 
supply problems arose.
Both transit states, the Ukraine and White Russia, 
have abused their strategic position in the trans-
port system in order to get significant concessions 
with regard to their own gas imports. According to 
the current estimates, the transit fees and the value 
of the cut-rate gas supplies based on the contracts 
concluded between Russia and the two transit states 
in the period from 2001 to 2003 amounted for the 
Ukraine to a share of 17 to 22 percent of the export 
profits. For White Russia the figure amounted to 
approximately 6 percent. Hence more than a quarter 
of the gas export profits have flown in the past as 
rents to the transit countries due to their strategic 
position in the existing transport system. 
Such a burden on the transit system has reduced 
the willingness to invest in the development of new 
gas fields and is also shared in the long term by the 
consumers in Europe in the form of higher prices 
for Russian gas. Furthermore, the latest events are 
a clear indication that an acute threat to the Euro-
pean gas supply can also arise from the unresolved 
transit conflicts.
Strategic Aim: Greater Independence 
from the Transit Sates
Incurring the financial and technical risks associ-
ated with the Nord Stream project, the companies 
in  volved are pursuing the strategic aim of having 
greater independence from the transit states. This 
hypothesis is confirmed by the results of the quanti-
tative game theory analyses carried out in a range of 
studies.10 In these studies, collaboration between the 
members of the Eurasian transport system is mod-
elled as a cooperative game in which the countries 
involved share the profit from the Russian natural 
gas exports to Western Europe based on the coun-
tries’ respective bargaining power.11 The model is 
calibrated based on the assumptions about the de-
mand for gas as well as production and transport 
costs. The optimal investments, supply volumes, 
profits and their allocation are calculated for dif-
ferent scenarios. Two variants—„status quo“ and 
„expansion options“—have been considered:
Status quo: With this variant it is assumed that the 
bargaining power of a player is only determined by 
the respective transport capacities that are already 
available. This variant corresponds to a very short-
term view in which the potential threat of the transit 
countries with respect to the use of the existing trans-
port capacities is in the foreground. Russia‘s gas 
exports to north-west Europe are currently   obliged 
to rely up to about 70 percent on their transit through 
the Ukraine and up to 30 percent through White 
Russia.12 The possibilities to play the two countries 
off against each other are limited. According to the 
model’s results, Russia could claim for itself just 
60 percent of the total profit. A good 30 percent has 
to be granted to the Ukraine in the form of transit 
fees or price reductions and 10 percent is allotted 
to White Russia. 
The Baltic Sea pipeline will dramatically alter the 
status quo and hence the short-term balance of 
pow  er. In light of the total capacities planned to be 
installed following the completion of the project, 
even a complete breakdown of supply through the 
Ukraine would have barely any consequences on 
the supply to north-west Europe. In this new status 
quo, transport capacities in Nord Stream and Yamal 
together would be sufficient to cover the predomi-
nant share of today‘s demand. And the event of 
supply disruption in White Russia alone would be 
10 See Hubert, F., Ikonnikova, S., in the passage cited.; Hubert, F., Ikonni-
kova, S.: Hold-Up, Multilateral Bargaining, and Strategic Investment: The 
Eurasian Supply Chain for Natural Gas. Discussion Paper 2004; Hubert, 
F., Suleymanova, I.: Strategic Investment in International Gas-Transport 
Systems: A Dynamic Analysis of the Hold-Up Problem. Discussion Paper 
of the DIW Berlin No. 846/2008.
11 The relative power of the countries in the transport system is deter-
mined based on the „Shapley value“. The „Shapley value“ together with 
the „core“ are the best known solution concepts for cooperative games. 
Shapley value assigns to each player a share of the total profit which is 
dependent on how large is the player‘s contribution to the cooperative 
profit of all the possible coalitions. For simplification purposes, the West-
ern European importers were not modelled as strategic players so that 
the distribution of the profits takes place only between Russia and transit 
states.
12 With regard to the south-east European countries, the Ukraine‘s po-
sition is even stronger. However this region was excluded from the ana-
lysis.Baltic Sea Pipeline
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of no significance. Accordingly, the share of the 
two transit countries in the gas export profits would 
drop from 40 percent to about 12 percent even in 
the short-term. Meanwhile Russia‘s share of the 
profits from the exports to north-east Europe would 
increase by 28 percentage points.13 
Expansion options: However these considerations 
still do not explain why Nord Stream is actually 
being constructed. It would be quite conceivable that 
Russia can strengthen its position in the negotiations 
solely by pointing out to the possibility to invest in 
alternative pipelines. This view corresponds more to 
a long-term perspective. When all of the possibilities 
to expand the transport system by creating additional 
capacities are included in the analysis, the situation 
clearly changes. According to the model’s results, 
Russia can increase its share to about 80 percent, 
while the shares of the transit countries are halved. 
This is due to the fact that the mere possibility alone 
that additional pipelines can be built weakens the 
position of the established transit countries. The 
relative shares are based both on the geography of 
the network as well as the differing investment costs 
of creating additional transport capacities. In the 
expansion options variant, the bargaining power of 
the current transit states results from the cost savings 
that the usage of the available capacities permits 
compared to the creation of the new capacities.
Institutional Weaknesses in White 
Russia and the Ukraine
In principle it would be quite conceivable that the 
parties involved agree to an expansion of the trans-
port system that minimises the investment costs 
and share the profits according the their long-term 
bargaining power. After all, expenses running into 
the billions could be saved by constructing more 
cost efficient pipelines.14 Such a solution can be 
guaranteed through explicit long-term contracts. It 
could also be achieved through repeated informal 
cooperation.
A contractual solution requires that the transit 
countries are able to make a credible and long-term 
commitment to rules of access to the pipelines and 
transit fees. However the institutional and political 
13 As the status quo analysis tends to overestimate the power of the 
transit countries, the strategic value of the construction of Nord Stream is 
also somewhat overestimated. If you take the mentioned above empiri-
cally derived value of approximately 75 percent for Russia as a basis, the 
result would be an increase of 13 percentage points.
14 Such attempts have been repeatedly undertaken. For instance in the 
contracts between Russia and the Ukraine in 2001/2002, plans for al-
ternative pipelines were discarded and serious discussions were held on 
investing in an extensive modernisation of the network in the Ukraine. 
However the implementation of the plan failed as did similar attempts 
in the 1990s due to the Ukraine‘s refusal to give up its control over the 
Ukrainian pipeline system.
conditions for such a commitment are not likely in 
either the Ukraine or White Russia. In both states the 
separation between the politics and the jurisdiction 
is not sufficient and hence the protection of property 
rights is not guaranteed. In countries with weak 
legal systems which are furthermore not effectively 
bound by international agreements, there is always 
the danger that once investments are made they will 
abuse their strategic position in the transport system 
to their own benefit.15 
It is primarily these institutional shortcomings, 
which make any credible commitment impossible, 
that lead to the incentive described in the status quo 
scenario to invest in pipelines that weaken the future 
bargaining position of the transit states. This can 
lead to overinvestment in expensive pipelines, but 
also to underinvestment in cost efficient pipelines 
depending on how the different pipelines change the 
bargaining position of the transit states. In this way 
all attempts have failed to raise the resources for the 
modernization of the pipeline system in the Ukraine. 
By contrast, from a Russian perspective it is worth 
installing significant overcapacities on a secure con-
nection Nord Stream. As calculations demonstrate, 
additional capacities on a scale of 60 to 80 billion 
cubic metres of gas at Nord Stream are justifiable 
even with moderate assumptions about the future 
demand. The investment costs are compensated by a 
clear increase in the bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
old transit states. In other words, substantial bene-
fits from the Baltic Sea pipeline will arise from the 
more favourable transit conditions for the already 
existing pipelines and through the higher gas prices 
for the Ukrainian and White Russia imports. The 
reason why the project can fulfil this function is 
its being oversized compared to the actual demand 
for additional transport capacity what creates a real 
alternative to the existing routes.
Cooperation Without Binding 
Contracts?
The last possibility to avoid costly overinvestment 
is delivered by dynamic strategies. With these strat-
egies the threat of investment in expensive pipelines 
like Nord Stream is repeatedly postponed as long as 
the transit states cooperate. i.e., forgo the gains of 
short-term rents resulting from their current bargain-
ing power and instead are satisfied with the transit 
fees and the gas prices corresponding to their long-
15 Of course such a danger is not valid for all transit countries. The in-
vestments in Poland for instance are extensively safeguarded against 
politically motivated interventions. In this country Gazprom has already 
won court investigations against an increase in the transit fees for the 
Yamal pipeline. In Slovakia and the Czech Republic the transit pipelines 
have been sold to western importers and the transport through them is 
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term position in the system. The success of this dynamic strategy is not dependent 
on the ability of the transit states to make lasting commitments as cooperation is 
supported instead by the threat to invest in the expensive pipeline Nord Stream 
once the transit states deviate from cooperative agreement. This strategy has been 
used in the past—with only moderate success however. At the end of the 1990s for 
instance, a pipeline was planned from White Russia through Poland to Slovakia, 
the only purpose of which would have been to bypass the Ukraine. The threat of 
this bypass reinforced the Russian position in the negotiations without it ever be-
coming a reality. In the event that Nord Stream really does get constructed at the 
planned capacity of 60 billion cubic metres of gas per year, the conclusion can be 
made that the countries involved have not managed to fully use dynamic strategies 
to support cooperation.
While it is true that investment can be postponed, once it has been made it can no 
longer be unmade. For this reason it is difficult in the context of dynamic strategies 
to support investments in cost efficient pipelines which permanently strengthen 
the bargaining power of the transit states. This is true both for the modernisation 
of the pipeline system in the Ukraine as it is for the second Yamal pipeline. Even 
viewed over the mid-term, both of these would create sufficient capacity for a 
realistic increase in Russian exports. However at the same time they would make 
investment in Nord Stream less attractive and hence weaken the credibility of the 
threat of investing in it in case the transit states deviate from cooperation. And 
thus, without a fundamental change in the underlying institutional conditions, there 
is almost no chance for these most cost efficient options for the expansion of the 
Eastern European gas transport system to be ever realised.
Conclusion: Nord Stream Baltic Sea Pipeline Secures the Supply 
of Natural Gas by Diversifying the Transit Routes
The Nord Stream Baltic Sea pipeline will be constructed for strategic reasons 
although it is the most expensive of all the transport system expansion options 
for north-west Europe. However its capacity will not be fully used in the foresee-
able future. Over the short- and mid-term the project will increase the security of 
supply to Western Europe because it will create a bypass option in the event of 
future conflicts with the transit states, White Russia and the Ukraine. Once it has 
achieved a capacity of 60 billion cubic metres of gas per year when construction 
is complete, Nord Stream could guarantee the supply to the northern regions of 
Western Europe even in the event of a breakdown in supplies through the Ukraine. 
The pipeline will permanently weaken the bargaining position of the transit states 
and hence it will clearly curtail the rents they gain at present due to their strategic 
position in the transport system. Over the long-term, lower fees for the gas transit 
and an improved supply security will also increase the willingness to pay the high 
development costs of new gas fields.